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JOSEPH BEAR and LARRY ALAN BEAR 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§30.1. Third party actions. The various state workmen's com-
pensation acts were originally intended to guarantee injured workers 
and their dependents a replacement of income loss at at least a sub-
sistence level. Payments were "guaranteed" in the sense that recovery 
was not to be based on any common law concept of fault but, to 
state it broadly and a bit too simply, upon work connection. 
In exchange for these assured benefits, the employee and his de-
pendents gave up their common law rights to sue the employer for 
damages for any injury covered by the act.1 However, the compensa-
tion acts were never intended to provide immunity to any stranger 
or ultimate wrongdoer who was in fact the cause of the employee's 
injury. Therefore, the acts generally provide that in any compensable 
industrial injury where there is ultimate legal liability on the part 
of some person other than the employer for the injury, the employee 
may elect either to sue the ultimate wrongdoer, commonly called a 
third party, in tort or to receive compensation. Under certain cir-
cumstances the employee is allowed to collect from both sources, 
although he is never allowed to retain an amount in excess of the 
larger of the two recoveries. 
The various state statutes differ in their definition of "third parties." 
The majority of them state that anyone other than the worker's em-
ployer is a third party.2 In Massachusetts, unfortunately, through a 
remarkably devious process of reasoning,3 co-employees and all con-
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§30.1. 1 A double compensation remedy is provided in most jurisdictions in 
cases in which the employer is guilty of serious and willful misconduct or its 
equivalent. See §30.2 infra. 
2 See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §72.10 (1952), and the cases cited 
therein. 
I Cf. id. §§ 72.31, 72.32. 
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tractors and their employees engaged upon a common employment 
are immune from third-party suit.4 
The Massachusetts third-party statute,1i construed during the SURVEY 
year in the leading case of Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. 
of Wisconsin v. Ford Motor CO.,6 is a very confusing one. It states: 
Where the [compensable] injury was caused under circumstances 
creating a legal liability in some person other than the insured 
to pay damages in respect thereof, the employee may at his option 
proceed either at law against that person to recover damages or 
against the insurer for compensation ... but, except as hereinafter 
provided, not against both. If compensation be paid under this 
chapter, the insurer may enforce, in the name of the employee 
or in its own name for its own benefit, the liability of such other 
person, and if, in any case where the employee has claimed or 
received compensation within six months of the injury, the in-
surer does not proceed to enforce such liability within nine 
months of said injury, the employee may so proceed.7 
The statute then provides that if the employee brings the action he 
must repay the insurer the statutory compensation benefits he has 
received from it but he may keep the excess. If the insurer brings the 
suit, it is allowed to keep, in addition to this repayment, one fifth 
of the excess over and above the benefits paid to the employee to-
gether with its proportionate share of the legal expenses. Furthermore, 
the statute provides that the employee may bring a third-party action 
at law and then discontinue it at any time "prior to trial." He may 
then pursue his compensation rights without being held to have 
made an election if he discontinues the third-party suit before the 
compensation carrier has lost its right to enforce the liability of the 
third party. 
In the Ford Motor case, one H had entered into a contract with 
Ford to paint the interior of a Ford plant. S, an employee of H, went 
to the Ford plant to perform this work. Before being given license to 
enter the plant, S was required to sign a waiver absolving Ford of 
all liability for damage to his person or property. While working in 
the Ford plant, S was involved in an accident and sustained serious 
injuries. He claimed workmen's compensation and received an award 
five months later. No appeal was taken by his employer's compensa-
tion carrier, and the carrier did not bring any action against Ford 
within nine months of the employee's injury. H and his compensa-
tion carrier later brought this suit in equity, asking for a declaration 
as to (1) the effect of the Ford waiver upon the employer-employee 
4 Caira v. Caira, 296 Mass. 448, 6 N.E.2d 431 (1937); Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 
Mass. 593, 190 N.E. 815 (1934). See also 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 
§§72.31-72.34 (1952). 
Ii G.L., c. 152, §15. 
6335 Mass. 504, 140 N.E.2d 634 (1957). 
7 G.L., c. 152, §15. 
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relationship between Hand Sand (2) the effect of the Ford waiver 
upon the right of the insurance carrier of H to maintain a third-party 
action against Ford under G.L., c. 152, §15. From a Superior Court 
decree dismissing the bill, H and his compensation carrier appealed 
to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Court affirmed the final decree, stating that since the Indus-
trial Accident Board had already held that S was entitled to work-
men's compensation, they had legally passed on the issue of the 
employer-employee relationship, and their adjudication, no longer 
subject to review or appeal, was not now open to collateral attack.s 
The Court further held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a 
declaration as to the effect of the waiver on their third-party rights 
against Ford because they had lost all their rights to proceed against 
Ford by not bringing any action within nine months of the original 
injury. 
The Court thus construed the nine-month period set forth in Section 
15 as a strict limitation on the right of the insurer to bring the third-
party action.9 A contrary holding would allow the third party to be 
subject to two suits for the same cause of action following the passage 
of nine months' time after the original injury. Although this would 
not present an insurmountable obstacle, nevertheless since the statute 
provides two different proportionate methods of distributing the 
proceeds of a third-party suit - the deciding factor being who "brings" 
the action - serious problems of disposition of the excess recovery 
would be presented which would be difficult of solution. The Court 
pointed out 10 that this strict nine-month limitation is not as onerous 
as it might appear since the insurer may bring its third-party action 
once claim has been brought against it, even though it has not yet 
paid compensation and, in fact, even though it may deny any liability.ll 
Although this most commendable decision clears up one of the 
problems inherent in our third-party statute, it also obliquely serves 
to point out the futility of attempting to handle important third-
party action problems through the medium of this poorly drafted 
statute. It is not feasible in this chapter to attempt to answer the per-
plexing problems left open by Section 15 but some of the more serious 
questions can be indicated. 
(I) Who has the right to "bring" the third-party action when the 
employee has made no claim for compensation 12 within six months 
of the date of injury, but when he does make his claim for compensa-
8335 Mass. 504, 506-507, 140 N.E.2d 634, 636 (1957), citing Boyle v. Building In-
spector of Malden, 327 Mass. 564, 566, 99 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1951). 
9335 Mass. 504, 508, 140 N.E.2d 634, 637 (1957). 
10335 Mass. at 508n.l, 140 N.E.2d at 637n.2. 
11 Furlong v. Cronan, 305 Mass. 464, 26 N.E.2d 382 (1940). 
12 The date of actual receipt of compensation is of no importance if it is later in 
time than the claim for compensation. Cf. Furlong v. Cronan, 305 Mass. 464. 26 
N.E.2d 382 (1940). 
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tion after six months and before the statute of limitations has run 
on the right to sue the third party for damages? 
(2) If the employee fails to bring any claim against anyone until 
after the statute of limitations has run on a potential third-party 
action, is he thereupon barred from pursuing his compensation claim 
against the insurance carrier because the insurer has now lost its rights 
to proceed against a third party? 13 
(3) In the latter case, would it be necessary for either the ad-
ministrative tribunal or the courts to decide on the merits of the 
third-party claim before the question could be answered? The Court 
has held that an employee who brings a third-party action and then 
discontinues it prior to trial and brings a compensation claim is 
barred from a compensation recovery if the statute of limitations 
has run on the third-party claim prior to the bringing of the com-
pensation action.14 But this decision was based specifically on the 
court's interpretation of the last sentence of Section IS, and not on 
the theory and purposes of Section IS as a whole. The gravamen of 
that case was not the fact that the employee had taken an original 
position after the statute of limitations had run on the third-party 
claim but rather that, contrary to the exact provisions of the statute, 
he had shifted his position to the detriment of the insurer, so that 
it subsequently lost the right the employee had previously perfected 
by his own affirmative action.15 
(4) What standing does the employee have in any third-party suit 
when the action is brought by the insurer under Section IS? Jury 
awards for serious injuries are rising at present and proper preparation 
and presentation of personal injury claims can lead to fairly sub-
stantial verdicts. The employee and his counsel have a strong interest 
in obtaining as large a verdict as possible to compensate the employee 
fully for his injuries. The insurance company and its counsel are 
interested primarily in getting their money back. Compensation bene-
fits are far lower than tort benefits in most cases, and any "excess" 
of one over the other would have to come from the coffers of a brother 
insurance company or possibly from the treasury of the same in-
surance company if it also insured the third party. One might at least 
hazard the opinion that the insurer who is suing his associate or 
himself is likely to have a different attitude toward the ultimate 
verdict in any given case than the employee himself. That portion 
of Section IS which requires approval of any proposed settlement by 
the Industrial Accident Board is not necessarily a protection for the 
employee because the statute does not set out what standing the em-
ployee has before the board in such a case. Unfortunately, the board 
has on occasion decided that the employee has no standing before it 
in such matters. 
13 Assume that the compensation claim itself has not been prejudiced by the 
delay of more than six months in filing. Cf. G.L., c. 152, §§41, 49. 
14 Broderick's Case, 320 Mass. 149, 67 N .E.2d 897 (1946). 
15320 Mass. at 152-154, 67 N.E.2d at 899-900. 
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(5) A third-party verdict brings a final definitive sum certain. Com-
pensation benefits, subject to certain dollar limitations,16 may extend 
into the indefinite future. 17 How much reimbursement is the insurer 
entitled to if it is still paying compensation at the time that the third-
party verdict is rendered or, even if not, if the compensation claim is 
still open into the indefinite future? 
These are some of the more important problems left unanswered by 
the third-party statute.18 The answer to these problems could be ob-
tained in lengthy, costly litigation. This is unsatisfactory for many 
reasons, the primary one being that broad unsettled questions and ex-
tensive appellate litigation are against the very purposes of the compen-
sation system itsel£.19 The only acceptable solution is the prompt 
enactment of the statute properly redrafted to cover the serious defects 
now existing. 
§30.2. Double compensation. Diaduk's Case1 and Juozapaitis's 
Case,2 decided during the SURVEY year, concern the double compensa-
tion feature of the Workmen's Compensation Act.3 They seem to cast 
more shadows over the already somber employer liability provision 
in our law. The section reads: 
If the employee is injured by reason of the serious and wilful 
misconduct of an employer or any person regularly entrusted 
with and exercising the powers of superintendence, the amounts 
of compensation hereinafter provided shall be doubled. In case 
the employer is insured, he shall repay to the insurer the extra 
compensation paid to the employee.4 
This section is worded exactly as it was in the original statute of 1912, 
making it one of the very few sections that have undergone no change 
in over forty-five years.5 
One might inquire as to what prompted the framers of our act 
16 G.L., c. 152, §§34, 35. 
17Id. §§30, 34A. 
18 Very recently the Court decided the evidentiary problem presented when the 
third-party defendant seeks to introduce evidence regarding compensation payments 
claimed by or made to the employee. The Court held the evidence to be inadmis· 
sible since the third party could not defeat or diminish the recovery against it by 
showing negotiations between the employee and the compensation carrier. Dreher 
v. Bedford Realty, Inc., 335 Mass. 245, 140 N.E.2d 180 (1957). 
19 See Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 7 NACCA 
L.J. 15 (1951); Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 129 
(1911). 
§30.2. 1 1957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623, 142 N.E.2d 356. 
2335 Mass. 137, 138 N.E.2d 756 (1956). 
3 G.L., c. 152, §28. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Acts of 1912, c. 571, § 1 added provisions relative only to the right of the em-
ployer to defend against these actions. Acts of 1934, c. 292, §2 added provisions 
relative to minors only in which violation of labor laws (c. 149) are concerned. Acts 
of 1943, c. 529, §9 only substituted text language relative to the status of an em· 
ployer as insured or self-insured. 
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to insert this employer personal liability into a completely new piece 
of social legislation. This is especially true since the concept of this 
legislation was so new and revolutionary that scholars were still 
arguing the constitutionality of the basic payments to be made to 
injured workers without fault on the part of the employer. Those 
who drew up the original act - the Commission on Compensation 
for Industrial Accidents which inserted this employer-personal-liability 
clause - stated the reason as follows: "This section will cover the 
failure by the employer or his superintendent to comply with statutory 
safety regulations so that it will operate to prevent the breach of 
such rules."6 
Of course, the statutory words used by the Commission were also 
strong enough to include any quasi-criminal conduct on the part 
of the employer or his superintendent, when workers were ordered 
to do work of a patently dangerous nature. But the framers of the 
act were apparently not concerned with that sort of conduct. That 
such conduct would be implicitly covered here was, no doubt, taken 
for granted. What they were disturbed about was the violation of 
statutory safety regulations by employers and the prevention of these 
violations. The Commission included in their report and discussion 
the language of comparable compensation act provisions in other 
jurisdictions.7 Their clear intent, then, was to promote safety in in-
dustry by imposing personal liability upon employers whose work-
shops and factories were or would continue to be a serious menace to 
workers. 
However, the Court, showing an astonishing lack of appreciation 
and understanding of this new social concept, seemed very reluctant 
to impose personal liability upon an employer for this sort of un-
desirable conduct. It unfortunately has looked at this double com-
pensation feature from the point of view of the employer and not 
the injured worker, overlooking in effect that the compensation laws 
were written not for the benefit of employers but of employees.8 While 
the general theory behind workmen's compensation continued to be-
come liberalized as the years advanced, the double compensation 
feature of our act was and still is being strictly interpreted in a most 
archaic fashion. 
Burn's Case 9 was the first case in which the Court was called upon 
to interpret this section. It held that the words "serious and wilful" 
were tantamount to "wanton and reckless" and applied also to con-
duct of a "quasi-criminal nature," citing a list of common law cases, 
6 Report of the Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents. July 1. 
1912, p. 48. The report was submitted in accordance with Resolves of 1910, c. 120. 
and Resolves of 1911, cc. 66, 110. 
7 Report of the Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents, July 1, 
1912, pp. 74 (Spain), 78 (California), 88 (New York). 
8 Meley's Case, 219 Mass. 136, 139, 106 N.E. 559, 560 (1914); 1 Larson, Workmen', 
Compensation Law §2.20 (1952). 
9218 Mass. 8, 10, 105 N.E. 601, 602 (1914). 
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and avoided completely any discussion of the intent of the framers of 
the original act. In Sciola's Case,1° the Industrial Accident Board 
found a failure to install safety devices as recommended by statute 
but refused to rule that this constituted serious and willful miscon-
duct. The Court upheld this refusal saying that the board did not 
have to rule as a matter of law that this was serious and willful mis-
conduct. In Beckles's Case,11 the board found that a contributing 
cause of the employee's death was the gross negligence of the em-
ployer in continuing to maintain and operate an elevator which 
experience should have told him could not be put into perfectly safe 
condition by the ordinary repairs attempted and made; however, the 
Court affirmed a finding that this did not constitute serious and willful 
misconduct. 
The Court in interpreting this section has apparently placed special 
significance on the doing of something, either with the knowledge that 
it is likely to result in serious injury or with a wanton and reckless 
disregard of its probable consequences.12 But a person does not have 
to do anything to be guilty of serious and willful misconduct. It was, 
in fact, lack of action by employers which originally prompted the 
enactment of this double compensation clause. 
In Diaduk's Case 13 the employee suffered a fatal accident and the 
widow claimed double compensation, alleging that the employer's 
violation of a regulation of the Department of Labor and Industries, 
made pursuant to statute, constituted serious and willful misconduct. 
The board found that the employee's death was caused "by negligence 
and disregard of the existing regulations on the part of the employer," 
but, following the language of the Court in similar cases, dismissed 
the double compensation claim, finding that the disregard of the 
existing regulations "was not such as to constitute serious and wilful 
misconduct nor wanton and reckless disregard of its probable con-
sequences."14 The Court affirmed the dismissal of the award stating 
that this finding was not unsupported by the evidence nor contrary 
to law.15 
Juozapaitis's Case 16 involved a 14Y2-year-old boy. A child's right to 
double compensation is based not only on the original section of the 
act but also upon a subsequent amendment which covers certain labor 
law violations in the case of minors.17 Because the statute refers to 
10 236 Mass. 407,128 N.E. 666 (1920). 
11230 Mass. 272, 119 N.E. 653 (1918). 
12 Randolph's Case, 247 Mass. 245, 247, 141 N.E. 865, 866 (1924). 
131957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623, 142 N.E.2d 356. 
141957 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 624, 142 N.E.2d at 357. 
1111957 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 624, 625, 142 N.E.2d at 358. See §33.l infra for a dis-
cussion of the judicial notice of administrative regulations issue in this case and 
Juozapaitis's Case, 335 Mass. 137, 138 N.E.2d 756 (1956). The Court held that, even 
if the regulations were properly before them, the double compensation claim would 
still not lie. 
16335 Mass. 137, 138 N.E.2d 756 (1956). 
17 Acts of 1934, c. 292, §2. 
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specific violations which constitute a conclusive presumption of serious 
and willful misconduct on the part of the employer 18 and because 
minors traditionally receive favored consideration from the courts,19 
the decision is more liberal. 
The injured employee in this case worked for a nurseryman and 
florist without a working permit as required by statute.20 This statute 
is not one of the prohibitive sections referred to in the double compen-
sation section of the act 21 and for that reason the board found no 
serious and willful misconduct on the part of the employer. However, 
the Court held that inasmuch as one of the purposes of a greenhouse 
is the sale of flowers, it was a mercantile establishment as defined by 
statute,22 and since the minor was employed in a mercantile establish-
ment without a working permit, such employment was in violation of 
C.L., c. 149, §60, one of the prohibitive sections.23 
This case and the Diaduk case 24 point out quite succinctly the atti-
tude of the Court in deciding these double compensation cases. A 
broad and liberal view is taken in minors' cases and a narrow com-
mon law view in cases concerning adults. This latter concept is 
clearly at variance with that expressed by the Court itself in other 
cases involving the Workmen's Compensation Act.25 The Court has 
talked about the compensation act as being not merely an amendment 
to the common law but a new and distinct piece of legislation enacted 
because former tort and common law remedies were, by public senti-
ment, regarded as inadequate.26 It would seem, however, that as a prac-
tical matter strict tort interpretations are still applied to Section 28 
of the act. Willful has been defined by the Court as an intentional 
wrongdoing with substantial certainty that harm will result.27 This 
is the common law tort definition which has led to the very strict inter-
pretation of legislation originally adopted along the lines of broad, 
liberal social policy. 
It cannot fairly be said that violations of statutory regulations or 
safety rules are at all times made by employers with substantial cer-
tainty that violations will result in harm to their employees. But cer-
tainly workshops, factories and mercantile establishments are not going 
to be made any safer for workers by the decisions in these double com-
18 Ibid. 
19 Ducas v. Prince, 1957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1249, 1251, 146 N.E.2d 677, 679; West's 
Case, 313 Mass. 146, 151, 46 N.E.2d 760, 764 (1943). 
20 G.L., c. 149, §86. 
21 Id., c. 152, §28, as amended. 
22 Id., c. 149, §l. 
23 Id., c. 152, §28, as amended. 
241957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623, 142 N.E.2d 356. 
25 Greem v. Cohen, 298 Mass. 439, 443, II N.E.2d 492, 494 (1937); Young v. Dun-
can, 218 Mass. 346, 349, 106 N.E. 1, 3 (1914). 
26 Greem v. Cohen, 298 Mass. 439, II N.E.2d 492 (1937). 
27 See Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 204, 72 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1937), in 
which the Court quotes the definition of reckless conduct in 2 Restatement of Torts 
§500, Comment f, in pOinting out the distinction between "wilful" and "reckless" 
conduct in the common law of torts. 
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pensation cases. Lack of positive intent to injure, or its equivalent, is 
hardly a moral excuse for industrial slaughter and if the law cannot 
regulate all such conduct in industry one would hope it might at least 
not protect it from the calculated ire of the original framers of our 
act. The Court could properly reverse its attitude in these double 
compensation cases, to the end of at least restoring the liberal precepts 
laid down in 1912 by the legislature. As Roscoe Pound has stated: 
I should not for a moment agree with the self-styled realists who 
would utterly reject stare decisis .... [Yet e]ven more objectionable 
is application of stare decisis to uphold decisions rendered prior to 
great monuments of social legislation, proceeding upon principles 
universally superseded by such legislation.28 
B. LEGISLATION 
130.3. Fatal cases: Burial expense. General Laws, c. 152, §33 has 
been amended by Acts of 1957, c. 270 which raises the amount payable 
to dependents for burial expense to $500 in each case. It further 
raises the liability of the insurer from $500 to $1000 in any case where 
there are no dependents of the deceased employee. 
§30.4. Contracts or agreements to insure employers. General 
Laws, c. 152, §54A has been amended by Acts of 1957, c. 275 so as to 
make it consistent with the present c. 152, §1, the employee coverage 
section of the compensation act, as most recently amended by Acts of 
1956, c. 680.1 
§30.5. Concurrent liability. Acts of 1957, c. 276 adds a new sec-
tion to G.L., c. 152. This new section, Section 26B, provides that where 
an employee engaged in concurrent employment 1 with more than one 
insured employer involved is injured while performing a duty that is 
common to all the employers, then each employer's insurer shall be 
jointly and severally liable for all compensation payments under the 
act. The payments that each insurer would be required to make would 
be based upon the proportion of the injured employee's total wages 
paid by its assured. 
§30.6. Second injury fund. General Laws, c. 152, §37 has been 
amended by Acts of 1957, c. 287 to provide for the payment of weekly 
dependency compensation 1 out of the second injury fund 2 established 
to partially relieve the insurer of certain compensation payments in 
cases where the employee had suffered certain serious physical injuries 
prior to his latest compensable injury. 
§30.7. Weekly benefits structure. The weekly dependency provi-
28 Editorial: Some Thoughts About Stare Decisis. III NACCA L.J. 19. 211 (1954). 
§1I0.4. 1 See 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 19.9. 
§1I0.5. 1 See 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.7. 
§1I0.6. 1 G.L., c. 152, §1I5A. 
2Id. §65. 
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sion of c. 1521 has been amended for the second time in two years 2 by 
Acts of 1957, c. 641 so that, in addition to his weekly compensation pay-
ment, the employee is now entitled to a payment of $4 per week for 
each dependent. 
§30.8. Municipal Court jurisdiction. General Laws, c. 152, §§8A, 
11, and llA have been amended by Acts of 1957, c. 693 to the end of 
giving the Boston Municipal Court concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Superior Courts in all cases of appeal from the decisions of the In-
dustrial Accident Board when the injury involved occurred in Suffolk 
County. Provision is made, however, for removal of any case from 
the Boston Municipal Court to Suffolk Superior Court on motion of 
any party in interest. 
§30.7. 1 C.L.. c. 152. §35A. 
2 See 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.l0. 
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